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HOW SHOULD STATES TREAT CRUIKSHANK FOLLOWING
HELLER? AN ANALYSIS OF A STATE COURT’S ABILITY TO
HOLD THAT SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT IS DEAD
Brian P. Wilson

I.

∗

INTRODUCTION

Recent developments in case law regarding the incorporation of
the Second Amendment raise the issue of whether a state court has
the power to disregard the precedent of the Supreme Court of the
United States where the court finds the precedent to be sufficiently
eroded to be considered dead. Specifically, state courts are faced
with deciding whether to treat the Second Amendment as incorpo1
rated following the District of Columbia v. Heller decision in the face of
2
United States v. Cruikshank’s holding that the Second Amendment is
3
not incorporated. The ability of a state court to disregard precedent
such as Cruikshank and the scope of such a power, if one indeed exists, shape our perception of the role of state courts and may rattle
long-held beliefs regarding the relationship between state courts and
the Supreme Court.
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court found that the
Second Amendment secured an individual’s right to bear arms for
4
traditional uses such as self-defense. This holding, however, is only
the beginning of a larger, and perhaps more vital, Second Amendment conversation—whether the Second Amendment should be understood to have been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. Heller stated that the case did not present the issue of
5
incorporation. The Court went on, however, to note that Cruikshank,
∗

J.D. Candidate, 2010, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S. Political
Science, 2005, Kean University. I would like to thank my grandfather, Arthur J. Jensen, for his love and support and for his guiding role throughout my life. You will
always be with me.
1
128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
2
92 U.S. 542 (1876).
3
Id. at 553.
4
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821–22.
5
Id. at 2813 n.23.
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which held that the Second Amendment is not incorporated, “did
not engage in the sort of Fourteenth Amendment inquiry required
by . . . later cases” but also noted that other cases “reaffirmed that
6
the Second Amendment applies only to the Federal Government.”
The Court then cited authorities using natural law and pre-existing7
rights language, which act as strong support for incorporation. With
the conflicting messages from the Court, the Heller holding has
created and will continue to cause confusion for state courts. For example, New York has seemingly ruled both ways on the issue. In
8
People v. Abdullah, a New York court held that “because the District of
Columbia is a federal enclave and not a State, Heller is distinguishable
and its holding does not invalidate New York’s gun possession laws or
9
10
regulations.” On the other hand, in People v. Lynch, a different New
York court apparently assumed that Heller applied and found that
“the Court specifically stated that this right is not unfettered and that
reasonable regulations for possession of a firearm outside of the
11
home shall be allowed.”
The question presented is not simply an incorporation issue; the
threshold question concerning how a state court should treat Heller
and Cruikshank is whether a state court has the power to disregard
Supreme Court precedent, and if such a power exists, when a state
court should do so. Prior to 1989, many scholars debated the con12
cept of anticipatory overruling. Anticipatory overruling has been
defined as the theory that a lower court should disregard Supreme
Court precedent when the lower court believes that the Supreme

6

Id.; see also Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 538 (1894) (reaffirming Cruikshank);
Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886) (reaffirming Cruikshank); United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1876).
7
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2792 n.7, 2793.
8
870 N.Y.S.2d 886 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2008).
9
Id. at 887.
10
No. 2005-2007, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4587 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 16, 2008).
11
Id. at *1–2. Notably, the circuits are now split on the issue of incorporation.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that “the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment and applies it against the states and local governments.” Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439, 457
(9th Cir. 2009). Conversely, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
upheld Cruikshank on the ground that lower courts are disallowed from overruling
Supreme Court decisions. See NRA of Am., Inc. v. City of Chicago, 567 F.3d 856, 858
(7th Cir. 2009). This further evinces the confusion among courts on the issue.
12
Frederic M. Bloom, State Courts Unbound, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 501, 504 n.16
(2008).
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Court itself would not follow it. In 1989, however, the Supreme
Court flatly denied lower federal courts the right to anticipatorily
14
overrule Supreme Court precedent. The Court in Rodriguez stated
that “the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own deci15
sions.” Although this holding prevented lower federal courts from
disregarding arguably dead Supreme Court precedent, that a state
court is similarly limited does not necessarily follow.
This Comment purposefully avoids addressing the issues of
Second Amendment rights and the incorporation of the Second
Amendment. Instead, it seeks to establish that a state court has the
power to disregard Supreme Court precedent in limited circumstances where a compelling argument demonstrates that the
precedent is dead because of more recent, conflicting decisions
handed down by the Court. Specifically, this Comment argues that
state courts may disregard precedent set forth in Cruikshank because
of the irrelevance of its outdated incorporation analysis. This proposition has been recently bolstered by the Heller decision, which casts
further doubt upon the validity of Cruikshank. But this line of reasoning is not limited to Heller; state courts should in all instances consider the continuing relevance, or lack thereof, of all questionable Supreme Court precedent.
Part II of this Comment sets forth the background information
that supports the theory that state courts may disregard Supreme
Court precedent when that precedent has been undermined by the
Court. It begins by briefly introducing the legal theories of anticipatory overruling and unbound state courts, sets forth and generally
analyzes the changes that have occurred during the development of

13
Steven Bradford, Following Dead Precedent: The Supreme Court’s Ill-Advised Rejection
of Anticipatory Overruling, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 39, 41 (1990). One’s position concerning anticipatory overruling is a reflection of one’s view of the hierarchy of the courts.
Proponents of anticipatory overruling argue that courts should recognize when Supreme Court precedent is dead independent of whether the Supreme Court has acknowledged the death, whereas opponents of anticipatory overruling argue that lower courts must follow Supreme Court precedent until the Court itself overrules it. See
id. at 40–41. Proponents essentially argue that courts should not be bound by
precedent that the Court itself would not follow; opponents argue the firmness of
stare decisis and the continuing validity of Supreme Court precedent that has not
been overruled. See id. at 43–44.
14
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484–85
(1989); see also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237–38 (1997) (following Rodriguez
and holding that the federal trial court was correct to wait for the Court to reinterpret questionable precedent).
15
Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 484.
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these theories, and finally states where these theories stand today. In
Part III, this Comment details the theory of anticipatory overruling
and how the theory may better support a state court’s ability, rather
than a federal court’s ability, to disregard dead precedent. Part IV
explains the theory of unbound state courts and presents several cases illustrating the point that state courts should indeed be unbound.
Part V introduces and analyzes Roper v. Simmons, in which the erosive
impact on precedent is remarkably similar to that which is found in
Heller. Then, Part VI, by comparing the conflict between Heller and
Cruikshank to Roper, supports a state court’s right to find Supreme
Court precedent dead. Part VII illustrates when a state court may
properly exercise this right and specifically demonstrates that a state
court may correctly disregard Cruikshank as dead precedent. Finally,
Part VIII discusses both the relevant factors of erosion and the standard a state court should apply to those factors and then applies
those factors and that standard to Cruikshank.
II. THE HISTORY OF COURTS DISREGARDING SUPREME COURT
PRECEDENT
Disregarding Supreme Court precedent is not a new proposal,
16
and stare decisis is not absolute. In fact, the Supreme Court’s own
treatment of stare decisis creates the confusion that leads a lower fed17
eral or state court to disregard Supreme Court precedent. Where
the Supreme Court issues an opinion that may undermine standing
precedent, a lower federal or state court is faced with the decision of
whether to follow the older precedent at the risk of rejecting the
newer precedent or to follow the newer precedent at the risk of dis18
regarding the older precedent. The question raised is which course
19
of action better conforms to the concept of stare decisis.

16

The Court does not hold that stare decisis bars the overruling of precedent;
rather, it considers the policies promoted by stare decisis before overruling. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970) (holding that courts must
consider that law should (1) be a clear guide for conduct, (2) promote predictability
and fairness in the law by reducing the need to relitigate like issues, and (3) maintain
faith in the judiciary). See generally David C. Bratz, Stare Decisis in Lower Courts: Predicting the Demise of Supreme Court Precedent, 60 WASH. L. REV. 87, 90 (1984) (stating that
stare decisis promotes (1) certainty in the law’s application, (2) fairness and efficiency in the legal system, and (3) maintenance of confidence in the judicial process).
17
See Bradford, supra note 13, at 40.
18
See id.
19
See id.

WILSON (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

3/15/2010 12:38 PM

COMMENT

375

Prior to 1989, numerous scholars considered a federal court’s
20
ability to anticipatorily overrule the Supreme Court. The Court’s
assertion in Rodriguez, however, that a lower federal court may not
21
overrule the Supreme Court put an end to much of this debate. Curiously, the Court did not provide much explanation for its rejection
of a lower federal court’s right to anticipatorily overrule Supreme
Court precedent, nor did it concern itself with the rights of state
22
courts. Both prior to and following Rodriquez, the Court never made
23
a similar assertion regarding state courts. As recently as 2005, in Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court reviewed a state court’s holding
that defied the Court’s precedent without mentioning the state
24
court’s ability to disregard Supreme Court precedent. Thus, Roper
lends support to the theory that state courts have been effectively unbound by the Supreme Court and may disregard outdated
25
precedent. The “unbound state court” concept, proposed by Frederic Bloom, essentially states that, for better or for worse, the Supreme Court permits state courts to disregard Supreme Court
precedent by making that precedent uncertain and establishing a de26
ferential habeas standard. The unbound-state-court concept, however, is seemingly applicable in many situations beyond simple habeas
27
proceedings.
The change in theory from anticipatory overruling to unbound
state courts is likely the result of the Supreme Court’s rejection of a
lower federal court’s ability to disregard binding precedent. The

20

See Bloom, supra note 12, at 504 n.16.
See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484–85
(1989).
22
See id. (referencing only the Court of Appeals). Both the majority and the dissent in Rodriguez simply dismissed the right of a federal court to anticipatorily overrule. Justice Stevens, in his dissent, cited this as a “duty of other federal courts to respect our work product.” Id. at 486 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This specific language
binding other federal courts, rather than all courts, may suggest a difference between
lower federal and state courts when interpreting precedent.
23
See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
24
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 559–60.
25
See generally Bloom, supra note 12, at 509–10 (discussing the theory of unbound
state courts).
26
Id. at 512.
27
See Jason Mazzone, When the Supreme Court Is Not Supreme 20 (Brooklyn Law Sch.
Legal Studies, Paper No. 131, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1348593 (arguing that many circumstances allow state courts
to make Constitutional interpretations “with little or no likelihood of review by the
Supreme Court”).
21
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newer unbound-state-court theory, however, sets itself apart from the
theory of anticipatory overruling by focusing on the mechanics of
how a state court is unbound by the Supreme Court rather than applying to state courts the rationale behind anticipatory overruling.
The unbound-state-court theory is a descriptive, rather than a norma28
tive, account of a state court’s ability to disregard precedent. This
Comment seeks to apply the rationale of anticipatory overruling to
state, rather than federal, courts not simply to establish how the Supreme Court allows state courts to be unbound but both to demonstrate that state courts have the power to disregard Supreme Court
precedent and to detail when and how state courts should exercise
this power.
III. ANTICIPATORY OVERRULING SUPPORTS A STATE COURT’S ABILITY
TO DISREGARD DEAD PRECEDENT
For obvious reasons, the theory of anticipatory overruling raises
questions regarding the role of a federal court that are particularly
related to stare decisis. This theory essentially weighs the benefits of
strict adherence to stare decisis and respect for the Supreme Court
against the interests of individual justice and making the law more
29
responsive to change. The considerations that likely led the Supreme Court to deny lower federal courts the right to anticipatorily
overrule Supreme Court precedent are more serious at the federal
level than at the state level; state courts, therefore, should not be similarly limited in their ability to disregard dead law.
A. Duty to Obey
Anticipatory overruling suggests that a court is under a duty to
anticipate what the Supreme Court would hold rather than to blindly
30
follow the precedent. Courts are expected, if not required, to apply
31
the most current and applicable rule of law to the case before it.
Anticipatory overruling, however, is not a way to simply disobey the
28

See id.
See Margaret N. Kniffin, Overruling Supreme Court Precedents: Anticipatory Action by
United States Courts of Appeals, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 53, 74–85 (1982).
30
Id. at 74.
31
Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974) (stating that “a court is to apply
the law in effect at the time it renders its decision, unless doing so would result in
manifest injustice”); United States v. Havener, 905 F.2d 3, 5 (1st Cir. 1990) (“One
principle of statutory interpretation urges an appellate court to assume that a . . .
new law . . . appl[ies] to cases on appeal, even if the new law leads to a different outcome.”). This assumption is implicit in the concept of stare decisis. See 1-6 Federal
Standards of Review (MB) § 6.01 (2008).
29
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Court; rather, it is premised upon the idea that the newer law may in
fact be what the Court would deem the applicable rule of law. The
supervisory nature of the Supreme Court over lower federal courts
may justify the Supreme Court’s rejection of the lower federal courts’
ability to overrule the Court’s precedent. Basic notions of federalism,
however, refute the belief that the Supreme Court has the same su32
pervisory power over state courts. In fact, the Supreme Court explicitly accepts that it holds no general supervisory power over the state
33
courts. Thus, the Court’s lack of similar supervisory power over
state courts results in a lessened interest, or perhaps even lack of ability, to similarly deny this right to state courts.
Furthermore, a state court serves a different master than a federal court does. Although state law is limited insofar as it must not
conflict with federal law, a state court is a creature of the state, and its
34
principal duties and obligations lie with the state.
Also, a state
court’s decision does not bind the federal government but generally
35
would bind the government of that particular state. The difference
between state and federal courts is significant in this regard. A state
court should have much less of a duty to obey arguably dead Supreme Court precedent that it finds to be irrelevant because the
forced following of dead law may injure the state or its citizenry. If a
state follows outdated precedent, it runs the risk of enforcing invalid
laws and offending individual rights. For example, it could lead to
the infringement of individual Second Amendment rights due to an
inability to disregard the outdated holding of Cruikshank. If a state
legislature agrees with Cruikshank that the Second Amendment does
not apply to the states and decides to pass laws that are offensive to
the Second Amendment, then the state courts, if bound by the outdated holding of Cruikshank, will have no recourse to defend the state
citizenry’s Second Amendment rights. Moreover, if state courts are
forced to follow dead Supreme Court precedent, then the govern-

32

Federal courts are Article III courts, which are inferior to the Supreme Court.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. On the other hand, state courts are creatures of the
states in which they are established and bound by the federal courts only insofar as
state law may not contradict federal law. See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
33
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 438 (2000) (“It is beyond dispute that
we do not hold a supervisory power over the courts of the several States.”).
34
Although a state court’s duty is to interpret the law of the state, it must also respect federal law that is on point; federal law is still the supreme law of the land. See
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
35
Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 361 (1952)
(“State laws are not controlling in determining what the incidents of this federal
right shall be.”).

WILSON (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

378

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

3/15/2010 12:38 PM

[Vol. 40:371

ments of the several states will be left with little to no recourse to correct any dead rule of law until the Supreme Court decides to explicitly overrule itself; a single state’s legislature and executive branch have
little control over federal law even where such law has a direct impact
on the state. The federal government is not similarly situated because it has the ability to effectively overrule law by either passing statutes that supersede judicial decisions or even amending the Consti36
tution. This is evident in the aggressive congressional reaction to
Supreme Court decisions during and following the Civil Rights
Movement where Congress legislatively overrode Supreme Court de37
cisions that were repugnant to Congress’s view of civil rights.
Moreover, Congress has provided to the federal courts statutory
tools by which they may deal with precedential ambiguities and dead
law even in the absence of the right to anticipatorily overrule Supreme Court precedent; state courts are not afforded similar tools.
For example, a federal district judge may certify an order for appeal
to the court of appeals where the issue “involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of
opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially
38
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” In addition, a
federal appellate court may certify a question of law to the Supreme
39
Court. The combination of these two statutory options eliminates
the need for any lower federal court to anticipatorily overrule Supreme Court precedent because the lower federal courts have a
means by which to send the issue to the Supreme Court. No similar
tool exists in the state courts. Consequently, a state court must rule
on the issue and is faced with the decision of whether to follow the
40
dead law. Because state courts may not avoid dead law like lower
federal courts can, state courts should be afforded the ability to disregard dead precedent where justice so requires.

36

See U.S. CONST. art. V.
See generally William N. Eskridge Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the
Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613, 624–41 (1991) (detailing civil rights related legislative overrides of Supreme Court decisions from 1972
through 1990).
38
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006).
39
Id. § 1254(2). The Supreme Court, however, has discouraged such upward
certification and stated that certification in this regard should be reserved for rare
instances. See Wisniewski v. United States, 353 U.S. 901, 902 (1957).
40
The district court, however, may not dodge the issue entirely; the issue must be
certified under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Nevertheless, the district court does have a
means by which to push the issue upward for review.
37
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B. Duty to Promote Justice
Perhaps the most convincing argument in favor of anticipatory
41
overruling is a court’s duty to promote justice. At both the federal
and state level, a judge’s application of precedent that may be per42
ceived to be outdated would be inherently unjust. Even though
judges might be opposed to binding precedent, they are nevertheless
bound by that precedent. No judge, however, should be bound by
law that is unconvincing in the face of newer law. To be bound by
the older law would be to undermine the justice sought by the application or creation of a newer law. For example, ignoring in the name
of stare decisis a 2008 Supreme Court holding that undermines a
1908 Supreme Court holding would defeat both the modern progression of the law and the justice sought by the newer decision.
C. The Need for Uniformity
While perhaps disregarding the need for individual justice in
specific cases, the concept of stare decisis promotes and strives to
43
achieve uniformity among judicial decisions. A stable judicial system
demands respect for stare decisis; “longstanding doctrine dictates
that a court is always bound to follow a precedent established by a
44
court ‘superior’ to it.” To provide stability in the law, courts must
45
respect precedent. At the federal level, a strong argument can be
made that federal courts should strictly adhere to stare decisis.
Where a federal court strays from precedent, the predictability of the
law is questioned and so is the respect for decisions of the Supreme
46
Court. But the lack of uniformity that already exists at the Supreme
Court level often gives rise to a lower federal or state court’s desire to
disregard precedent. For example, in regard to Heller and Cruikshank,
courts may be tempted to disregard the precedent set forth by the
Court in Cruikshank because of the Court’s language in Heller that

41

Kniffin, supra note 29, at 75.
Id.
43
Id. at 80–85.
44
Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46
STAN. L. REV. 817, 818 (1994).
45
See, e.g., CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1961 (2008) (“Principles of stare decisis, after all, demand respect for precedent . . . . Were that not so,
those principles would fail to achieve the legal stability that they seek and upon
which the rule of law depends.”).
46
See id.
42
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47

seemingly undermines Cruikshank. Such lack of uniformity in the
Court’s decisions creates the need for state courts to essentially
choose which line of reasoning to follow.
Further, the uniformity argument weakens when applied to the
states as opposed to the federal government. Historically, the states
have been regarded as laboratories for new ideas and have been en48
couraged to experiment. Admittedly, the Heller and Cruikshank cases
49
are concerned with federal, not state, law. Therefore, the question
arises whether the states-as-laboratories theory can be extended to a
50
state court’s interpretation of federal law.
The states-as-laboratories theory is perhaps most effective in
areas that are traditionally state responsibilities, such as health care
51
and crime. Where federal law, however, is in a state of uncertainty—such as where federal precedent has been eroded—the underlying concept of the states-as-laboratories theory supports the notion
that state courts should have the ability to disregard precedent where
the Supreme Court itself has created the uncertainty, especially with
regard to interpretation of the Second Amendment, which directly
52
affects both serious crime and gun control. On occasion, the Supreme Court itself creates uncertainty in an area of law by issuing
conflicting holdings. Providing state courts the ability via the statesas-laboratories theory to disregard one precedent during the period
of time that the Court has not finalized the issue by explicitly overruling either of the conflicting precedents may benefit both the Court
53
and the several states.

47

See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821 n.23 (2008) (stating
that Cruikshank did not undergo a modern incorporation analysis); United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1876) (holding that the Second Amendment is not
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and is therefore not applicable to the
States).
48
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (describing states as laboratories).
49
The cases concern the Second Amendment. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2788; Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553.
50
Indeed, Jason Mazzone argues that early state courts freely applied the Bill of
Rights to state action. Jason Mazzone, The Bill of Rights in the Early State Cases, 92
MINN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2007).
51
David C. Mangan, Note, Gonzales v. Raich: The “States as Laboratories” Principle
of Federalism Supports Prolonging California’s Experiment, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 521, 543
(2007).
52
See generally id. at 543–44 (noting the advantages of using states as laboratories
in areas such as crime).
53
Cf. Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme
Court’s Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 699, 716 (1984) (dis-
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Where subsequent Supreme Court decisions erode the validity of
prior decisions, uniformity is already offended. The lower federal
courts and state courts are not asked whether to follow uniformity;
they are faced with the issue of how to deal with the pre-existing lack
of uniformity that surrounds the issue at hand. For example, with regard to incorporation, a lower federal or state court is faced with the
decision of whether to follow Cruikshank’s perhaps outdated holding
54
that the Second Amendment is not incorporated or to follow Heller’s
declaration that the modern incorporation doctrine set forth in Dun55
56
The courts are asked
can v. Louisiana is required in all cases.
whether it is worse to disregard reasoning set forth within a modern
decision than to dismiss the holding of an older, perhaps eroded, decision. Indeed, a state or federal court could do great harm to the in57
stitutions of justice by following dead precedent.
The Court has expressed its concern about the dangers of lower
federal courts anticipatorily overruling Supreme Court precedent
58
and has stated that lower federal courts may not do so. Notions of
federalism and the understanding of the states as laboratories for
changing ideas, however, may undermine the uniformity argument as
59
it applies to state courts. Having advanced the argument that the
theory of anticipatory overruling strongly supports a state court’s ability to disregard dead precedent, this Comment continues to consider
how state courts remain, in many circumstances, free to do so.
IV. STATE COURT HISTORY OF DISREGARDING DEAD PRECEDENT
Although it appears to be a commonly held assumption that the
Supreme Court is never challenged by other courts, lower federal and
state court expressions of willingness to overrule Supreme Court
60
precedent do, though perhaps uncommonly, occur. In fact, state

cussing the theory of percolation and the importance of allowing courts to independently decide issues before the Supreme Court rules on the issue).
54
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553.
55
391 U.S. 145, 164, 171 (1968).
56
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2813 n.23 (2008).
57
See infra Part IV.B.
58
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484–85
(1989).
59
See generally Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (providing a thorough
discussion of federalism and dual sovereignty).
60
See Bradford, supra note 13, at 43 n.19.
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courts have disregarded Supreme Court precedent in several land61
mark cases as recently as 2007.
A. The Theory of Unbound State Courts Coupled with the Concept of
Anticipatory Overruling
Although a state court’s decision to disregard Supreme Court
precedent may simply be deemed a misinterpretation of the law on
62
review by the Court, it sometimes succeeds. This success has been
63
explained by the theory of unbound state courts. The theory in its
basic form states that the Supreme Court has given some of its inter64
pretive authority to the states through an unbinding process. This
unbinding process has two steps: first the Court creates uncertainty in
the law, and then the deferential habeas standard shields even incor65
rect rulings. Frederic Bloom analyzes unbound state courts in the
66
context of habeas review, but habeas review is only one of many
67
areas in which state courts may avoid review by the Supreme Court.
For example, Jason Mazzone cites to several circumstances that allow
for state authority on matters of Constitutional interpretation that the
Supreme Court is unlikely to review, including (1) “rules of preclusion”; (2) “the role of state courts in adjudicating criminal cases”;
68
and (3) “the possibility of state decisions flying below the radar.”
This unbound-state-court theory is interesting in several regards.
First, it approaches a state court’s ability to disregard Supreme Court
precedent in a much different manner than the way in which the anticipatory-overruling theory interpreted the right of lower federal
courts to do the same. The desire to set the unbound-court theory
apart from the anticipatory-overruling theory may be attributed, at
least in part, to the Supreme Court’s denial of a lower federal court’s
69
right to anticipatorily overrule Supreme Court precedent. This is

61

See generally Smith v. Texas, 550 U.S. 297 (2007); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551 (2005); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
62
See generally Roper, 543 U.S. 551.
63
See generally Bloom, supra note 12 (explaining the mechanics of the unbound
state theory).
64
Id. at 506.
65
Id. at 512.
66
See generally Bloom, supra note 12.
67
Mazzone, supra note 27, at 20.
68
Id.
69
See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484–85
(1989) (holding that the Court of Appeals should leave the prerogative of overruling
Supreme Court decisions to the Supreme Court).
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doubtlessly a valid concern, but the unbound-state-court theory does
not acknowledge the validity of the arguments in support of anticipatory overruling as they relate to state courts. Second, the unboundstate-court theory is a descriptive, rather than a normative, explana70
tion of the unbinding process. It thoroughly analyzes the way in
which the Supreme Court has unbound state courts but does not
provide the same thorough analysis of a state court’s interest in being
71
unbound. For these reasons, this Comment accepts the theory of
unbound state courts but expands upon it by applying the underlying
themes of anticipatory overruling to state courts. As a result, cases of
lower federal courts engaging in anticipatory overruling as well as arguments generally in favor of anticipatory overruling provide support
for a state court’s right to disregard dead Supreme Court precedent.
B. The Dangers of Denying the Right to Disregard Dead Precedent
Illustrated
If a court is bound by arguably dead precedent, new holdings
will be effectively infertile until the Supreme Court expressly overrules the older precedent. But modern, emerging rules of law that
clearly undermine precedent should not be overlooked in the name
of stare decisis. Two particular instances in the Court’s history may
illustrate the crippling effect a strict view of stare decisis would have
72
on the nation.
1.

Brown and Plessy: The Civil Rights Movement

In 1954 the Supreme Court issued an opinion in Brown v. Board
73
of Education that many regard to be its most crowning achievement;
the Supreme Court rejected the separate-but-equal doctrine and held
74
public-school racial segregation to be unconstitutional.
The language of Brown, however, rejected the separate-but-equal doctrine on75
ly as it applied to public education. Prior to that decision, the Su76
preme Court established in Plessy v. Ferguson that publictransportation segregation was constitutionally permitted. Following

70
Bloom, supra note 12, at 502 (noting that “the Court willingly permits state
courts to disregard Supreme Court precedent”).
71
Id. at 548–50.
72
See infra Part IV.B.1.
73
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
74
Id. at 495.
75
Id.
76
163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
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Brown, the separate-but-equal doctrine was on shaky ground at best,
but Plessy had not been explicitly overruled.
Under the Rodriguez view, lower federal courts would still have
77
been bound by Plessy until it was explicitly overruled; however, this
was not the case. Lower federal courts actively anticipatorily overruled Plessy, and the Supreme Court affirmed the anticipatory over78
79
rulings in per curiam decisions. In fact, in Dawson v. Baltimore City,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit noted that the authority of segregation cases like Plessy had been “swept away by the
80
subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court.” Indeed, the Supreme
Court affirmed this holding with no criticism of the lower federal
81
court’s decision to disregard the precedent.
Aside from illustrating that the Supreme Court did not criticize
the lower federal courts for dismissing Plessy as dead law, a greater
lesson may be learned: the anticipatory overrulings played a considerable, if not vital, role in the progression of the civil-rights movement in the American judicial system. The Supreme Court affirmed
the anticipatory overrulings of Plessy but only insofar as the courts below addressed the issue. For example, through Supreme Court affirmances of lower federal court anticipatory overrulings, the separate-but-equal doctrine was found to be inapplicable to beaches, then
82
buses, and then public parks. Had the lower federal courts not
chipped away at Plessy, the civil rights movement arguably might have
suffered. In fact, not until 1967, thirteen years after Brown, did the
Supreme Court clearly state that “equal application does not immunize [a] statute from the very heavy burden of justification . . . required
83
of state statutes drawn according to race.” In this setting, the possible implications of the federal courts failing to anticipatorily overrule

77

See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484–85
(1989) (holding that the Court of Appeals should leave the prerogative of overruling
Supreme Court decisions to the Supreme Court).
78
See, e.g., New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass’n v. Detiege, 252 F.2d 122,
123 (5th Cir. 1958), aff’d, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (per curiam); Browder v. Gayle, 142 F.
Supp. 707, 717 (D. Ala. 1956), aff’d, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam).
79
220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955).
80
Id.
81
Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877, 877 (1955) (per curiam).
82
See, e.g., New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass’n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54, 54
(1958) (per curiam) (public parks); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903, 903 (1956) (per
curiam) (buses); Dawson, 350 U.S. at 877 (per curiam) (beaches).
83
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967).
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Plessy are frightening: minorities would have had to wait as long as
84
thirteen years after Brown to receive the relief that they deserved.
2.

85

Barnette v. West Virginia State Board of Education : A
Strong Argument for Disregarding Dead Precedent

Barnette involved the enforcement of a regulation that required
86
students to salute the flag. This requirement was challenged as a violation of the students’ religious liberty as protected by the First
Amendment, which is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
87
Amendment. Prior to Barnette, the Court held in Minersville School
88
District v. Gobitis that such a regulation did not offend the Constitu89
tion. The district court in Barnette, however, found that the Supreme Court had since undermined Gobitis as precedential authori90
ty. The court expressed that it would ordinarily “feel constrained to
follow an unreversed decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States” regardless of whether it agreed with the Court but that recent
developments illustrated that the Court itself had impaired that au91
thority. Specifically, the court held that it “would be recreant to our
duty as judges . . . [to] blind[ly] follow[ ] a decision which the Su92
preme Court itself has thus impaired as an authority.” On that basis,
93
the court disregarded Gobitis as dead precedent.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Barnette decision and did not
deny the lower court’s strong language supporting the ability to dis94
regard the questioned precedent. This illustrates that anticipatory
overruling has benefitted the judicial process where the Court’s subsequent decisions have eroded precedent.

84

See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text.
47 F. Supp. 251 (S.D. W. Va. 1942), aff’d, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
86
Id. at 252.
87
Id.
88
310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943).
89
Id. at 599–600.
90
Barnette, 47 F. Supp. at 252–53 (noting that members of the Court referred to
Gobitis as “public expression . . . that it is unsound” and noting the Court’s decision
to avoid it as precedential authority in a subsequent related case).
91
Id.
92
Id. at 253.
93
See id.
94
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 643 (1943).
85
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95

V. ROPER V. SIMMONS : A MODERN EXAMPLE OF A STATE COURT’S
RIGHT TO DISREGARD SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
96

Prior to Roper, the Supreme Court held in Stanford v. Kentucky
97
that the Constitution does not prohibit the execution of minors.
98
Simmons, at seventeen years of age, committed a murder. His guilt
was not questioned; he even bragged that he could get away with the
99
murder because he was a minor. Simmons was tried as an adult and
100
the State successfully sought the death penalty.
The Missouri Su101
preme Court affirmed the death sentence. Subsequently, in Atkins
102
v. Virginia, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments prohibited the execution of mentally retarded per103
sons. Following the Atkins decision, Simmons filed for state relief,
104
and the Missouri Supreme Court granted it. The court held that
a national consensus has developed against the execution of juvenile offenders, as demonstrated by the fact that eighteen states
now bar such executions for juveniles, that twelve other states bar
executions altogether, that no state has lowered its age of execution below 18 since Stanford, that five states have legislatively or by
case law raised or established the minimum age at 18, and that
the imposition of the juvenile death penalty has become truly un105
usual over the last decade.

On that basis, the state court disregarded Stanford, which was
106
Supreme Court precedent.
The Supreme Court affirmed the holding of the state court with
no criticism of the state court’s decision to disregard the Court’s
precedent, even though the dissent in the state court’s decision,
quoting Rodriguez, explicitly argued against the state court’s right to

95

543 U.S. 551 (2005).
492 U.S. 361 (1989).
97
Id. at 380.
98
Roper, 543 U.S. at 556.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 557–58.
101
Id. at 559.
102
536 U.S. 304 (2002).
103
Id. at 321.
104
See State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 413 (Mo. 2003), aff’d, 543
U.S. 551.
105
Id. at 399.
106
Id. at 400.
96
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107

make such a decision. And even though the parties presented the
108
issue to the Court, no discussion was provided as to either a state
court’s right to interpret the constitution or anticipatorily overrule
109
Instead, in reaching its affirmance, the Court consithe Court.
dered and analyzed state trends regarding the Eighth Amendment
110
and the execution of both the mentally retarded and juveniles.
111

VI. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. HELLER AND THE POWER TO HOLD THAT
SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT IS DEAD
A. History: United States v. Cruikshank

112

Cruikshank was heard during the horrors of a nation influenced
by the Ku Klux Klan. The case concerned what has been remembered
as the Colfax Massacre, during which a group of whites banded together and killed a large group of blacks on Easter Sunday by burning down the building in which they had assembled and shooting
113
those who tried to escape. Several counts were brought against the
conspirators, including conspiracy to hinder persons’ right to assem114
ble and their right to bear arms. The Supreme Court dismissed the
indictment and held that because neither the First nor Second
Amendments were incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment,
115
those Amendments only protected against federal action.
This holding is plainly outdated because it found the First
116
Amendment to be unincorporated.
Furthermore, Cruikshank “did
not engage in the sort of Fourteenth Amendment inquiry required

107

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005); Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 421
(Price, J., dissenting).
108
Brief for Petitioner at 11, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633) (arguing that a state
court may not overrule Supreme Court precedent no matter how antiquated or questionable the ruling may be).
109
Roper, 543 U.S. at 560.
110
Id. at 565–67.
111
128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
112
92 U.S. 542 (1876).
113
Timothy Sandefur, Can You Get There from Here?: How the Law Still Threatens
King’s Dream, 22 LAW & INEQ. 1, 12 (2004); Frederick M. Lawrence, Civil Rights and
Criminal Wrongs: The Mens Rea of Federal Civil Rights Crimes, 67 TUL. L. REV. 2113,
2151–52 (1993). See generally CHARLES LANE, THE DAY FREEDOM DIED: THE COLFAX
MASSACRE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE BETRAYAL OF RECONSTRUCTION (2008).
114
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 551–53.
115
Id. at 551–54.
116
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2813 n.23 (2008).
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117

by . . . later cases.” The Duncan case quite clearly illustrates the difference between a modern incorporation analysis and incorporation
analyses undertaken by the Court prior to Duncan: “Earlier the Court
can be seen as having asked, when inquiring into whether some particular procedural safeguard was required of a State, if a civilized system could be imagined that would not accord the particular protec118
tion.”
Subsequent to Duncan, the Court asks if a protection is
119
“necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty.” Duncan essentially discredits the Palko method of incorporation, which
120
But Cruikrequired courts to use the “civilized system” method.
shank did not even conduct a Palko analysis; it applied the SlaughterHouse reasoning by conducting a privileges-and-immunities analysis
121
rather than a due process analysis.
Essentially, Cruikshank is two
steps removed from modern incorporation. This creates a strong
probability that the precedential value of Cruikshank is questionable.
122

B. District of Columbia v. Heller

Heller challenged a handgun prohibition in the District of Columbia on the basis that it was an infringement of his Second
123
Amendment right to bear arms.
The Supreme Court interpreted
the Second Amendment to protect an individual’s “inherent right of
124
self-defense.” Although the Supreme Court found that an individual’s right to bear arms may not be infringed by the federal government, it noted that the question of incorporation was not presented
125
in Heller. The Court, however, went on to note that Cruikshank similarly held the First Amendment to be unincorporated and did not
126
engage in a modern incorporation analysis.
Insofar as incorporation of the Second Amendment is concerned, the language in Heller creates confusion by commenting that
Cruikshank did not undertake the required modern incorporation

117

Id.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968).
119
Id. at 150 n.14.
120
Id.; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
121
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1876) (stating that the Second
Amendment only applies to Congress); see generally Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36
(1873) (conducting a privileges-and-immunities analysis).
122
128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
123
Id. at 2788.
124
Id. at 2818.
125
Id. at 2813 n.23.
126
Id.
118
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analysis yet not overruling Cruikshank. Heller sets forth reasons why
precedent, such as Cruikshank, which holds the Second Amendment
128
to be unincorporated, is questionable.
State courts are left to decide whether they should defer to Supreme Court precedent that the
Court itself has questioned or, alternatively, disregard precedent that
the Supreme Court explicitly decided not to overrule.
C. A Comparison of Roper v. Simmons
Incorporation Issue Raised by Heller

129

with the State

Roper and Heller are comparable in several regards. First, the
cases are only three years apart; Roper was decided in 2005 and Heller
in 2008. The proximity in time between the cases likely leads to a
reasonably certain conclusion that the Supreme Court would treat
the cases similarly if they raise similar issues. The less time between
cases, the less likely it is that the Court will change its reasoning.
Second, both cases concern the interpretation of the Bill of
Rights: Roper concerns the Eighth Amendment, and Heller concerns
130
the Second Amendment. This also may lead to an assumption that
the two issues will be treated similarly. Although the Heller issue may
be further complicated by Fourteenth Amendment incorporation issues, both cases concern the way in which a provision of the Bill of
Rights will affect state law.
Third, the judiciary is considered by many to be the champion of
the minority and the protector of civil liberties because of its counter131
majoritarian role.
Therefore, if this argument holds merit, the
Court might be more likely to affirm a state’s expansion of the Bill of
132
Rights than to affirm a restriction. Notably, in Michigan v. Long, Justice Stevens stated in dissent that the Court should not review state
court decisions in which the state “simply provided greater protection

127

Id.
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2812–16.
129
543 U.S. 551 (2005).
130
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2788; Roper, 543 U.S. at 559–60.
131
This view dates back to the Federalist Papers, in which Alexander Hamilton
stated that “the independence of the judges may be an essential safeguard against
the effects of occasional ill humors in the society.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 528
(Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961). This assumption, however, is not at all
uncontested: Cruikshank and Dred Scott both exemplify the Court’s denial to protect
minority rights in past decisions. See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542
(1876); Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
132
463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
128
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to one of its citizens than some other State might provide or, indeed,
133
than this Court might require throughout the country.”
Fourth, both cases deal with state-court action. Roper was a rul134
ing of a state court interpreting the Eighth Amendment; state
courts following Heller will also tackle the incorporation issue.
Fifth and finally, both cases concern precedent that is outdated
and questioned by the Supreme Court. In State ex rel. Simmons v. Ro135
per, the Missouri Supreme Court stated that “the rationale for the
Supreme Court’s determination that the execution of juveniles was
not cruel and unusual punishment has disappeared, and that the
136
Eighth Amendment bars [a juvenile’s] execution.”
The Supreme
Court in Roper confirmed the Missouri Supreme Court’s reasoning by
noting that a majority of states now reject the death penalty for minors and holding that such bans are required by the Eighth Amend137
ment. That finding in Roper was brought about by the state court’s
rejection of Stanford, which held that the execution of a juvenile did
not offend the Eighth Amendment, and the expansion of Atkins,
which held the execution of mentally retarded persons to be offen138
sive to the Eighth Amendment.
Similarly, state courts faced with
the incorporation issue raised by Heller must decide whether to follow
the outdated law and reasoning of Cruikshank or adopt principles set
forth in more recent precedent engaging in a modern Fourteenth
139
Amendment analysis.

133
Id. at 1068 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Mazzone, supra note 27, at 70–71
(analyzing Justice Stevens’s position on Supreme Court review of state court decisions that expand Constitutional protection).
134
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555–56 (2005).
135
112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003), aff’d, 543 U.S. 551.
136
Id. at 399.
137
Roper, 543 U.S. at 568.
138
Id. at 555–56, 564; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989); see Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2649
(2008) (stating that “the Court held in Roper and Atkins that the execution of juveniles and mentally retarded persons violates the Eighth Amendment because the offender has a diminished personal responsibility for the crime”); see generally Bruce J.
Winick, The Supreme Court’s Evolving Death Penalty Jurisprudence: Severe Mental Illness as
the Next Frontier, 50 B.C. L. REV. 785 (2009) (detailing the diminished capacity/responsibility rule set forth by Atkins and Roper).
139
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2813 n.23 (2008) (noting
that Cruikshank did not engage in the modern incorporation analysis that is required
today). Seemingly, if a state court were able to find Stanford, a 1989 case, to no longer be binding, then Cruikshank, an 1876 case, could just as easily be held by a state
court to be dead law.
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Although Roper and Heller have many common features, several
distinct differences between the cases also exist. First, the cases concern different constitutional amendments—Roper concerns the Eight
Amendment and Heller concerns the Second Amendment. While
both cases deal with the Bill of Rights, this does not automatically result in equal treatment. For example, in Slocum v. New York Life Insur140
ance Co., the Supreme Court held that the Seventh Amendment is
141
not applicable to the states.
Also, a difference may exist in the degree to which the
precedent in question has been damaged. When Roper disregarded
Stanford as precedential authority, the Atkins court had already deli142
vered what may be considered a fatal blow to Stanford’s holding.
Atkins was binding Supreme Court precedent that touched directly
on the evolving standards of decency concerning cruel and unusual
143
Atkins found that the
punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
execution of the mentally retarded offended our standards of decency and easily made a case for questioning the execution of juveniles;
Roper cited to the similarities of the two issues in stating that “[t]he
evidence of national consensus against the death penalty for juveniles
is similar, and in some respects parallel, to the evidence Atkins held
sufficient to demonstrate a national consensus against the death pe144
nalty for the mentally retarded.”
On the other hand, the Heller holding did not contradict Cruik145
shank; it did not address the issue of incorporation. Furthermore,
much of the language in Heller that may be read to discredit Cruik146
shank is mere footnote dicta. But notably, the dicta is indeed a powerful argument against Cruikshank because the dicta expressly states
147
that the Cruikshank reasoning is outdated.
Despite the several distinctions between Heller and Roper, the
cases are similar enough to be treated alike. A supportable argument
can be made that the Supreme Court would affirm a state court’s
finding that Cruikshank is dead law and may therefore be disregarded
just as the Court in Roper disregarded Stanford. Furthermore, the

140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147

228 U.S. 364 (1913).
Id. at 376–77.
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005).
See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002).
Roper, 543 U.S. at 564.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2813 n.23 (2008).
Id.
Id.
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Court would affirm even if it found that the state court was wrong to
anticipatorily overrule but was correct on the merits. In both instances, the state court is relying on Supreme Court precedent that
undermined the analysis and holding in the questioned precedent.
The cases both concern a state court’s interpretation of the Bill of
Rights and the expansion of those respective rights. Additionally, the
cases are very close in time, which indicates that the Supreme Court
148
may treat them similarly.
Just as the Supreme Court did not take
issue with Roper’s defiance of dead Supreme Court precedent, the
Court is not likely to take issue with a state court disregarding Cruikshank on almost identical grounds. But it does not necessarily follow
that the Court will accept such reasoning. The Court may overrule a
149
state court’s interpretation of the Constitution, and it could find
that Cruikshank still stands when applying a modern Fourteenth
Amendment analysis. The issue at hand, however, is not whether a
state court’s interpretation will stand as constitutional law; the issue is
whether the state court has the right to engage in the sort of analysis
that allows the state court to decide whether arguably dead precedent
may be disregarded. The answer to this question seems to be in the
affirmative.
VII. THE STATE COURT STANDARD FOR DISREGARDING
SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
A state court should exercise its power to disregard Supreme
Court precedent where (1) the precedent in question has been
eroded by the Supreme Court itself, and (2) the state court is nearly
certain that the Supreme Court would overrule the eroded law. Saying that a state court may disregard Supreme Court precedent is one
thing, but saying that a state court should do so is quite another.
Specifically, finding that a state court may disregard Cruikshank in
light of Heller is not the end-all solution concerning whether a state
court should take such action. When deciding whether a state court
should disregard Supreme Court precedent, a court should consider
a culmination of factors, none of which is dispositive, and be nearly
certain that those factors would lead the Supreme Court to overrule
that precedent.

148
See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970) (stating that predictability of law is an important concept of stare decisis).
149
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 335 (1816) (holding that
the Supreme Court may review state court decisions).
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A. Factors that Illustrate the Supreme Court’s Erosion of the Questioned
Precedent
Ultimately, the states are free to set their own standards concerning whether the state courts should consider the precedent dead.
But this Comment argues that when assessing the continued validity
of Supreme Court precedent, state courts should limit their inquiry
to Supreme Court action. The specific factors set forth are mere examples of Supreme Court action that may be persuasive to state
courts; they are not intended to be all inclusive. The states may place
more weight on certain factors than others and are in fact encouraged to do so. For example, a state court would be wise to consider a
holding to be more persuasive than dicta, but this is not to say that
Supreme Court dicta may not erode a prior holding. State courts are
well equipped to balance the persuasiveness of these various factors
in deciding whether Supreme Court precedent is dead.
Undeniably, the most important factor in considering whether a
court should disregard Supreme Court precedent is the status of that
precedent. A court must consider whether subsequent Supreme
Court decisions have eroded the rule of law set forth by the case in
150
question.
A state court should look to the Supreme Court’s deci151
sion when deciding whether precedent has been eroded.
Roper
clearly supports this line of reasoning by holding Stanford insufficient
152
in light Atkins’s holding.
Precedent may be eroded by subsequent holdings that are contrary to the rule in question. For example, in Roper, the questioned
precedent was undermined by the subsequent Atkins decision, which
held, in direct conflict with the prior holding, the execution of the
153
mentally retarded to be cruel and unusual punishment. Thus, the
Atkins decision not only overruled the precedent that the mentally retarded may be executed, but it also damaged and eroded precedent
that held that the execution of minors did not offend the Eighth
154
Amendment. Many of the arguments set forth in Atkins that overruled the precedent allowing for the execution of the mentally retarded also damaged the precedent allowing the execution of minors,
150

See Kniffin, supra note 29, at 53–54 (stating factors to be considered when deciding whether to anticipatorily overrule Supreme Court precedent).
151
Cf. Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 79 (1994) (discussing the consideration
of dicta in court decision making).
152
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005).
153
Id. at 559.
154
Id.
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such as the growing national consensus against the death penalty for
155
both the mentally retarded and juveniles.
Another way that Supreme Court precedent may be eroded is
through changing trends in Supreme Court decisions. This may occur if a holding is grounded in a certain rule of law and the Supreme
156
Court moves away from that rule of law. For example, in Spector Mo157
tor Service, Inc. v. Walsh, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit anticipatorily overruled the Court and noted that “perhaps
most important of all, are the broad trends in favor of [a new doc158
trine] shown of late by the present Court.”
Although perhaps less persuasive, awareness that the Supreme
Court is waiting to overrule the precedent may erode that
159
precedent. This factor may be less persuasive than the previous factors because awareness that the Court seeks to overrule a precedent
does not bind any court. Nevertheless, a court may conclude that the
Supreme Court’s desire to overrule sufficiently erodes the precedent
in question. The Supreme Court may have indicated that it is await160
ing a particular type of case to overrule the questioned precedent.
A court may properly interpret such action to be an invitation to find
161
that precedent to be dead.
On the other hand, a court may feel
bound by the decision and compelled to await the Court’s decision to
overrule that precedent. Perhaps the best course of action would be
for state courts to consider the Supreme Court’s desire to overrule as
162
supplementary support for finding that precedent to be dead law.
State courts, however, should not disregard Supreme Court

155

Id.
Kniffin, supra note 29, at 63.
157
139 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1943).
158
Id. at 816.
159
Kniffin, supra note 29, at 65 (outlining the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit’s anticipatory overruling based on the prediction that the Supreme Court was
awaiting the proper case to overrule the precedent in question).
160
See Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 657 n.14 (1965) (holding
that the decision did not overrule the precedent in controversy and that the Court
would wait for a proper case in which to do so).
161
See, e.g., Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 441 F.2d 1222, 1224 (5th Cir.
1971) (finding that the case before it was “precisely the case for which the Supreme
Court [had] been waiting”), aff’d, 406 U.S. 320 (1972).
162
See Kniffin, supra note 29, at 66 (“In some instances . . . the likelihood of a particular Supreme Court action is used as a supporting factor after another reason for
anticipatory overruling . . . .”).
156
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precedent simply to force the Supreme Court to reconsider the issue
163
where the Court has not indicated a desire to do so.
Similarly, Supreme Court dicta is not binding on any court but
may be very persuasive in deciding whether the precedent in question
164
is dead.
A statement in dicta made by a Supreme Court majority
that questions the validity of prior precedent sheds much light on the
precedential value of that holding. Related to that point, dissenting
Supreme Court authority may perhaps to a lesser degree serve as
supporting authority for finding questionable Supreme Court authority to be dead.
165
By way of example, in Saenz v. Roe, Justice Thomas, in his dissenting opinion, stated, “Because I believe that the demise of the Privileges or Immunities Clause has contributed in no small part to the
current disarray of our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, I
166
would be open to reevaluating its meaning in an appropriate case.”
A state court would be hard-pressed to hold that Justice Thomas’s willingness to reevaluate the Privileges or Immunities Clause alone sufficiently erodes the validity of the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. But if Justice Thomas’s dissent were accompanied by a
later change in the Court’s interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, then perhaps a state court might find the dissent to be
particularly persuasive. Had Justice Thomas spoken for a unanimous
Court, even if mere dicta, this statement would be far more persuasive, but it does not follow that a dissent can therefore never support
a finding that precedent is dead. The state courts must decide the
persuasiveness of such factors.
Not all Supreme Court activity, however, should be considered
when deciding whether Supreme Court precedent is dead. For example, a change in the Court’s membership does not invite a state
court to disregard otherwise valid precedent. Such a practice has the
167
potential to compromise the stability of the judicial system. A judicial system where the precedential value of every Supreme Court decision could be undermined and disregarded by any court in the

163

See Booster Lodge No. 405, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1143,
1150 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (stating that a lower court’s “function” was not to overrule
Supreme Court precedent to force reconsideration of the issue).
164
Commonwealth v. Reaves, 923 A.2d 1119, 1135 (Pa. 2007) (Baldwin, J., dissenting) (arguing that dicta serves to undermine precedent).
165
526 U.S. 489 (1999).
166
Id. at 527–28 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
167
But see Kniffin, supra note 29, at 67.
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United States based on the current membership of the Court would
prove disastrous to judicial stability.
For example, if a Justice of the Supreme Court who took part in
168
the majority opinion in Roe v. Wade retires and is replaced by a Justice who is of the opinion that it was wrongly decided—resulting in
the erosion of the precedential value of that case and an invitation
for state courts to disregard it as a precedential matter—the state
courts would effectively be adjudging the precedential value of Roe v.
Wade based simply on the number of Justices who signed off on the
opinion. The fact that the decision of a divided court is still binding
169
precedent is well established. If the change in membership, however, were to be followed by a Supreme Court opinion, whether majority or dissent, that asserted the invalidity of Roe v. Wade, then an analogy could be made to Justice Thomas’s dissent discussed above, and
such an opinion could perhaps serve as valid supplemental authority
in a finding that Roe v. Wade is dead precedent. But such authority
would likely not be sufficient on its own. In other words, the perception that the Court may now be more conservative than it once was
should not entice a conservative state court to disregard Roe v. Wade.
A state court must wait for the Court to take affirmative steps to erode
the precedent. Similarly, state courts should not disregard Supreme
Court precedent simply to force the Supreme Court to reconsider the
issue.
A state court never has the duty or even the right to disregard
otherwise binding Supreme Court precedent without Supreme Court
action. Rather than predict whether the Court will overrule the questioned precedent of its own volition, a state court should decide
whether the Court has already taken steps that have eroded the holding of the questioned precedent. In the judicial branch of government, only Supreme Court precedent can undermine Supreme Court
precedent; state courts may only derive the ability to disregard that
precedent where the Supreme Court itself has called its precedential
value into question.

168

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See United States v. Girouard, 149 F.2d 760, 763 (1st Cir. 1945) (“It is true that
these decisions were by a divided court but . . . we are bound to accept the law as
promulgated by these decisions.”).
169
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B. The Standard in Determining the Degree to Which the Supreme
Court Has Eroded the Precedent in Question
Once a court has recognized the proper factors to be considered, it must then weigh the persuasiveness of those factors and decide whether those factors support a conclusion that the Supreme
Court would overrule that precedent. Courts have been torn when
attempting to define the proper standard by which a court should
170
find Supreme Court precedent dead.
Notably, the federal cases
that set forth the standards below all pre-date Rodriguez because that
case rejected the concept of anticipatory overruling; consequently,
lower federal courts were denied any right to disregard Supreme
171
Court precedent after 1989.
1.

Differing Standards Set Forth by Courts

Three standards have been established by which courts have decided whether the Supreme Court would overrule the precedent in
question. The most rigid, and this Comment argues the most proper,
standard is the “near certainty” standard. This standard reflects a
fear of abuse by lower federal or state courts as well as a reverence for
stare decisis. A court applying this standard is hesitant to disregard
Supreme Court precedent unless Supreme Court opinions “already
delivered have created a near certainty that only the occasion is
172
needed for pronouncement of the doom.”
Another standard set forth by courts is the “high probability”
standard. Invoking perhaps a less rigid standard, other courts have
indicated that the correct analysis of whether disregarding Supreme
Court precedent is proper turns on whether a high probability exists
173
that the Court would overrule the decision in question.
Other
courts have used the terms “powerfully convinced,” “convinced,” or
“strong evidence” as standards for when the Court would overrule a
174
decision.

170

See Bradford, supra note 13, at 45–46.
See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484–85
(1989).
172
Salerno v. Am. League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 429 F.2d 1003, 1005 (2d Cir.
1970); see also Olson v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 806 F.2d 731, 734 (7th
Cir. 1986).
173
See, e.g., Levine v. Heffernan, 864 F.2d 457, 461 (7th Cir. 1988).
174
See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 868 F.2d 236, 241 (7th Cir. 1989) (“strong evidence”); Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1123 (7th Cir. 1987) (“powerfully
convinced”); Indianapolis Airport Auth. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 733 F.2d 1262, 1272
(7th Cir. 1984) (“convinced”).
171
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The least rigid standard proposed by courts is the “preponderance” standard. A minority of courts have taken the position that a
court may disregard Supreme Court precedent if it is more likely
than not that the Supreme Court itself would overrule the questioned
175
This standard may be an overly relaxed vision of the
precedent.
176
concept of stare decisis. If a court is simply predicting whether it is
probable that the Supreme Court may overrule a questioned decision, the court gives little weight to the precedent. Such a practice
could be very detrimental to stare decisis and the stability of the judi177
cial system.
2.

Judge Posner’s Analysis

Judge Posner, prior to Rodriguez, had endorsed the right of a
court to disregard arguably dead Supreme Court precedent and in
178
fact wrote the opinions in several of the above cited cases. At first
glance, Judge Posner’s analysis of the standard applicable to questionable Supreme Court precedent seems confusing. Further analysis, however, relieves this confusion and supplies a single standard to
be applied.
Judge Posner argued that lower courts have the right to disregard Supreme Court precedent where utilizing that precedent would
179
be to apply dead law. He never referred to such a decision as anticipatory overruling. In contrast, when engaging in what has since
been labeled anticipatory overruling, Judge Posner stated that
[the court is] not “overruling” [Supreme Court precedent] . . . .
Constitutional law is very largely a prediction of how the Supreme
Court will decide particular issues when presented to it for decision. Ordinarily the best predictor of how the Court will decide
an issue in a future case is how it decided the same issue in a past
case, and when that is so the law is what is stated in the earlier decision. But sometimes later decisions, though not explicitly overruling or even mentioning an earlier decision, indicate that the
Court very probably will not decide the issue the same way the

175

See, e.g., Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. Walsh, 139 F.2d 809, 814 (2d Cir. 1943).
See Bradford, supra note 13, at 46–47.
177
Cf. Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651, 715
(2005) (stating that “prediction . . . undermines the rule of law by over-emphasizing
the role of individual judges”).
178
See Colby, 811 F.2d at 1123; Olson v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 806
F.2d 731, 734 (7th Cir. 1986);
Indianapolis Airport Auth. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 733 F.2d 1262, 1272 (7th Cir. 1984);
Minority Police Officers Ass’n. v. South Bend, 721 F.2d 197, 201 (7th Cir. 1983).
179
Norris v. United States, 687 F.2d 899, 904 (7th Cir. 1982).
176
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next time. In such a case, to continue to follow the earlier case
blindly until it is formally overruled is to apply the dead, not the
180
living, law.

Judge Posner seemed to believe that analyzing the continuing
validity of Supreme Court precedent is not only the right but the duty
of a court when considering the applicable law concerning the case
181
before it.
In subsequent opinions, Judge Posner addressed the right to disregard dead precedent and used varying terms, which may have
caused confusion as to what standard should be applied. In Norris,
Judge Posner stated that a court may disregard precedent where it is
“very probable” that the Supreme Court will no longer follow the
182
One year later, in Minority Police Officers
questioned precedent.
183
Ass’n v. South Bend, he described the standard as “strong evidence”
that the Supreme Court would overrule the precedent if it had the
184
chance.
Yet another year later, in Indianapolis Airport Authority v.
185
American Airlines, Inc., Judge Posner described the standard simply
as “convinced” that the Court would overrule if given the opportuni186
ty. Although one may interpret a convinced standard to be less rigid than either very probable or strong evidence, further analysis of
the language leads to the inevitable conclusion that the standard remains the same. When defining the standard as “convinced that the
Court would overrule the decision if it had the opportunity to do so,”
Judge Posner cited directly to Norris, which defined the standard as
187
very probable.
Judge Posner did not intend to alter the standard
set forth in his previous opinions; if he did have such intent, he
would not have provided a direct citation to those standards when articulating his opinion.
188
Next, in Olson v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., Judge
189
Posner described the standard as “almost certain.” Again, when defining the standard, Judge Posner provided a direct citation to Nor-

180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189

Id.
See id.
Id. at 904.
721 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 201.
733 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1272.
Id. (citing Norris, 687 F.2d at 902–04).
806 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 734.
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191

ris. Finally, in Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., Judge Posner articulated the
standard as “powerfully convinced that the Court would overrule it at
192
the first opportunity.” This quotation directly cites to Olson, which
193
in turn directly cites to Norris.
The result of this chain of opinions that cite to one another for
direct support is simple—Judge Posner sets forth but one standard
for courts analyzing whether Supreme Court precedent is dead law.
Whether Judge Posner calls the standard very probable, strong evidence, convinced, almost certain, or powerfully convinced, his view of
the standard remains the same. A court should consider whether applying of the precedent in question would constitute applying dead
law. According to Posner’s analysis, this takes more than a balancing
of the scale or a “more probable than not” analysis; a court must exhibit a strong degree of certainty that likely mirrors the most rigid
194
standard discussed above.
Supreme Court law is dead where the
precedent has been eroded by subsequent Supreme Court holdings
and the application of that law would be contrary to the more recent
holding or rule of law. If the precedent is severely eroded, a state
court should be nearly certain that the Court would overrule the
195
precedent before pronouncing its death.
Essentially, the analysis
that a state court should undertake before disregarding Supreme
Court precedent is a two-step test: the court should (1) decide if the
precedent in question has been eroded by the Supreme Court and
(2) be nearly certain that the Court would overrule the eroded law.
3.

State Courts Should Apply Judge Posner’s Standard

Judge Posner’s standard appears to express both a need for certainty and a high probability that the Court would overrule its
196
precedent. These standards were set forth separately above to illustrate the confusion that has plagued courts and scholars alike in determining when a court should disregard what it perceives to be outdated precedent. An analysis of Judge Posner’s opinions, however,
seems to lead to the conclusion that the standards are one and the
same. A high probability that a particular event will occur axiomati190

Id. (citing Norris, 687 F.2d at 902–04).
811 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1987).
192
Id. at 1123.
193
Id. (citing Olson, 806 F.2d 731).
194
See Norris, 687 F.2d at 904.
195
See id. (discussing dead law); see also Kniffin, supra note 29, at 61–64 (discussing
erosion).
196
See Norris, 687 F.2d at 904; Olson, 806 F.2d at 734.
191
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cally nears certainty that it will indeed happen. Furthermore, it is unlikely that any case will ever present a formula for determining the
probability that the Supreme Court would overrule. Therefore, a
court should not concern itself with the differing definitions of high
probability and near certainty; it should simply look to the Supreme
Court opinion that erodes the precedent in question and determine
if the newer decision creates a high degree of certainty that the ques197
tioned precedent is dead law.
VIII.THE POSNER STANDARD APPLIED TO ALL FACTORS
CONCERNING HELLER
State courts have been and will continue to be faced with the dilemma of whether to treat Cruikshank as dead law. Thus far, New
York has been faced with a legal issue that resulted in a Heller analysis
198
without addressing the issue of incorporation.
Specifically, the
court considered whether a New York gun regulation violated the
199
Second Amendment. The court rejected the argument and noted
200
that Heller allows for reasonable regulations. The fact that the New
York court did not address incorporation can be viewed in one of two
ways. One possibility is that the court found that Heller provided an
on-point analysis of the issue that was sufficient to support the judgment even assuming incorporation and therefore did not need to
address the incorporation issue. On the other hand, the court possibly took incorporation for granted. The New York court could have
simply issued a ruling that held that Heller did not apply to New York
law. Such a decision, however, may be a red flag for Supreme Court
review; the court’s holding was much safer because the court did not
engage in an incorporation analysis. Where a court’s finding is consistent with Heller’s regulation analysis, a court may not want to address Cruikshank or incorporation; however, where a state gun regulation may not be consistent with Heller, a state court may be forced to
discuss the incorporation issue.
Prior to Heller, Cruikshank’s validity may have been undermined
when the Supreme Court decided to adopt the selective201
202
Indeed, the court in Nordyke v. King
incorporation doctrine.
197

See Norris, 687 F.2d at 904.
See People v. Lynch, No. 2005-2007, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4587, at *1–2 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. July 16, 2008) (holding that Heller allows for reasonable regulation of firearms).
199
Id. at *1.
200
Id. at *1–2.
201
See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
198
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noted that “Cruikshank and Presser involved direct application and incorporation through the Privileges or Immunities Clause, but not in203
corporation through the Due Process Clause.”
The Ninth Circuit
then went on to hold the Second Amendment to be incorporated
204
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Modern incorporation doctrine may lead the Court to reach an out205
come contrary to that of Cruikshank, just as the Ninth Circuit did.
Also, the validity of Cruikshank has been undermined because it stated
that both the First and Second Amendments were not incorporated.
The First Amendment has since been incorporated, which calls into
206
question both the reasoning and holding of Cruikshank. Moreover,
although Heller declined to address the issue of incorporation, the
Court noted that Cruikshank did not engage in a modern incorpora207
tion analysis and did not incorporate the First Amendment. Finally,
Heller cited to several authorities that use natural-rights language that
208
may be a nod to incorporation.
A. Incorporation of the First Amendment Undermines Cruikshank’s
Reasoning
As early as 1925, the Supreme Court undermined the holding of
Cruikshank by incorporating the First Amendment in Gitlow v. New
209
Gitlow arguably overruled Cruikshank insofar as the First
York.
Amendment is concerned and casts a shadow of doubt upon Cruik210
shank’s reasoning regarding the Second Amendment.
A court,
however, may overrule any portion of an opinion while leaving the
211
remainder of the opinion intact.

202

Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439 (9th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 448.
204
See id. at 457.
205
See id.
206
See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
207
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2813 n.23 (2008).
208
See id. at 2792 n.7, 2793.
209
See Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 666.
210
Gitlow may have assumed incorporation arguendo, but subsequent Supreme
Court opinions confirmed the First Amendment’s incorporation. See, e.g., Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931) (“It is no longer open to doubt that the liberty
of the press and of speech is within the liberty safeguarded by the [D]ue [P]rocess
[C]lause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action.”).
211
See, e.g., Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978)
(overruling Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), “insofar as it holds that local governments are wholly immune from suit”).
203
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B. Modern Incorporation Doctrine Undermines Cruikshank
Although Gitlow in and of itself may not render Cruikshank dead
law, further doubt is cast upon Cruikshank by the rise of modern incorporation doctrine. In Duncan v. Louisiana, the Court endorsed
212
the selective-incorporation doctrine. Cruikshank did not engage in
a modern incorporation analysis; the Court simply announced that
213
the Second Amendment only applies to the national government.
Courts now engage in an incorporation analysis and decide whether a
constitutional protection is made applicable to the states through the
214
Fourteenth Amendment. Undoubtedly, a change in doctrine calls
into question a decision based on the older doctrine. This change in
doctrine, however, does not itself undermine Cruikshank’s holding
that the Second Amendment is not incorporated if subsequent decisions affirming Cruikshank apply the relevant doctrine. Although unlikely, the case may be that under modern incorporation doctrine,
Cruikshank still stands. Cases since Cruikshank have also held that the
215
The cases that support
Second Amendment is not incorporated.
Cruikshank’s non-incorporation of the Second Amendment, however,
suffer from the same flaw from which Cruikshank suffers; they predate the incorporation era and therefore do not engage in the incor216
poration analysis now required by the courts.
Cruikshank mentions the Second Amendment but once and does
not give the concept of incorporation any thought or analysis whatsoever. The Court simply states that “[t]he second amendment . . .
means no more than that [the right to bear arms] shall not be in217
fringed by Congress.” Therefore, Cruikshank has been eroded by a
change in doctrine; it did not engage in the incorporation analysis
now required by the courts nor did the subsequent cases that support
218
it. Erosion of the precedent by a change in legal doctrine may or
may not be enough for a state court to consider Cruikshank to be
dead law. For example, the Ninth Circuit found that Cruikshank was

212

See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 163–71 (1968).
See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1876).
214
See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 147–49.
215
See Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 538 (1894); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252,
265 (1886).
216
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2813 n.23 (2008) (stating that
the Fourteenth Amendment inquiry set forth by later cases is now required). Compare Miller, 153 U.S. at 538, and Presser, 116 U.S. at 265, with Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 157–58 (1968).
217
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1876).
218
See Miller, 153 U.S. at 538; Presser, 116 U.S. at 265; Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553.
213
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dead law because it did not conduct a modern incorporation analy219
sis, whereas the Seventh Circuit found that such a change in doc220
trine is insufficient.
C. Heller Directly Undermines Cruikshank
Heller states that “[w]ith respect to Cruikshank’s continuing validity on incorporation, a question not presented by this case, we note
that Cruikshank also said that the First Amendment did not apply
against the States and did not engage in the sort of Fourteenth
221
Cruikshank did
Amendment inquiry required by our later cases.”
not engage in a detailed analysis of the Second Amendment nor did
it supply the required Fourteenth Amendment incorporation analy222
sis. Although Heller consciously chose not to overrule Cruikshank, it
223
clearly damaged its precedential value.
Cruikshank’s dismissive
analysis of incorporation would be unlikely to satisfy modern incorporation doctrine. Furthermore, Heller directly damaged the continuing validity of Cruikshank by noting its lack of a modern incorpora224
tion analysis. Therefore, with little left for the Cruikshank decision
to rest on, a state court could rightfully find Cruikshank to be dead
law.
IX. CONCLUSION
A state court indeed has the ability to disregard Supreme Court
precedent that it finds to be dead law. This is supported by the underlying concepts of both anticipatory overruling and unbound state
courts, which illustrate that stare decisis is not simply blind adherence
to precedent. The ability of a state court to disregard Supreme Court
precedent, however, is also not absolute. Before exercising this ability, a state court should come to a conclusion that the precedent in
question is dead law. This would mean that because of Supreme
Court action a court would be applying law that the Supreme Court
itself has undermined. This erosion of precedent coupled with a
high degree of certainty that the eroded precedent will no longer be

219

See Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439, 457 (9th Cir. 2009).
See NRA of Am., Inc. v. City of Chicago, 567 F.3d 856, 860 (7th Cir. 2009)
(“How arguments of this kind will affect proposals to ‘incorporate’ the [S]econd
[A]mendment [is] for the Justices rather than a court of appeals.”).
221
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2813 n.23 (2008).
222
See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553.
223
See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2813 n.23.
224
See id.
220
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followed by the Supreme Court authorizes state courts to disregard
the dead law.
The question of how a state court should treat Cruikshank in the
face of Heller is an excellent illustration of the scope of a state court’s
right to disregard Supreme Court precedent. Cruikshank was undermined by many different factors that are all relevant to the scope of
this power. The Court’s treatment of Cruikshank in Heller indicates
direct erosion of precedent and the changing trends of Supreme
225
Court doctrine. In the end, a combination of those factors demonstrates that a state court may treat Cruikshank as dead law in light of
Heller and therefore may disregard the precedent.
Surely the analysis set forth in this Comment is not limited to
Cruikshank. State courts should conduct this analysis whenever Supreme Court precedent seems questionable. The analysis protects
the interests of stare decisis by limiting proper erosion to Supreme
Court action while also considering the need for a state to keep its
laws in line with current decisions of the Court. Notions of federalism and the idea of states as laboratories may support this right more
readily for state courts than for federal courts; therefore, the Court’s
denial of a federal court’s ability to overrule Supreme Court
precedent possibly cannot and should not extend to a state court’s
ability to disregard dead law. Stare decisis is not offended where the
precedent is dead and the death is caused by the Supreme Court itself.

225

See id.

